Although brokerage contracts were very popular in the land country, the courts did not obtain such agreements. The court noted that “it was not a promise to marry her, but not to marry anyone, and yet she was not obliged to marry him.” The Court found the contract null and void, as it was purely restrictive and did not have a commitment to sue on both sides. Shalini has an office supplies and books store in a place in Bareilly. A Zahida person plans to open his store with similar goods in the same place. Fearing competition in the market, Shalini entered into an agreement with Zahida not to open its business in the region for 15 years and promised in exchange to pay him a certain amount of money each month. Later, Shalini will not pay the agreed amount. Zahida is trying to take the case to court. The agreement is inconclusive, Zahida has no case. In the meantime, the judiciary has followed this interpretation and, therefore, any agreement to restrict marriage, in whole or in part, is annulled in India. This goes against English law, which allows agreements for partial withholding marriage. Marriage intermediation contracts, which differ from marriage limitation agreements, are defined as third-party compensation contracts for negotiations, purchases or marriages. It can be noted here that marriage mediation was at least among pre-independent Hindus in India, as in The Hindu Law of After a sale of Goodwill, the seller continued to have the right to run a competing business. But if it is agreed by a contract that the seller will not sign in such a contract, these rights are dissolved.
One can absolutely be deterred from marrying or marrying for a specified period of time or being partly deterred from marrying a person or class of people, and in one of the events mentioned above, the agreement is not valid. Section 26 does not distinguish between absolute and partial restrictions on the freedom of marriage. This has been strictly followed by the courts in various cases. The Partnership Act of 1932 provides another exception to the rule limiting trade restriction agreements. There are three exceptions in the law. These conditions are as follows: There are certain conditions that validate a restriction to trade during a sale of value or value: in Venkatakrishnayya v. Lakshminarayana, the question was referred to Full Bench, whether a contract to make a payment to the father given his birth of his daughter in marriage, is immoral or consider public order within the meaning of Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act. Full Bench found that such a contract was immoral and contrary to public policy. The Full Bench dealt only with one case where it was a promise to the father to bring him into the marriage. Thus, the Commission envisaged limiting the Adrand of the section by rendering null and void any agreement to completely restrict marriage, while allowing a partial reservation if the agreed withholding was deemed appropriate by the Tribunal in the circumstances. This would allow for several agreements that could be better for both individuals and society.
Although marriage customs were only partially part of the payment of a certain amount, they are at odds with Section 26 of the Contracts Act.