Unilateral Executive Agreements

The Bricker Amendment, approved by the Senate Justice Committee in June 1953, reaffirmed the predominance of the Constitution over treaties; the necessary implementing provisions “that would be valid without a contract” before a contract can be entered into in the United States; and gave Congress the power to oversee all executive agreements. Unlike the process of denouncing executive agreements, which has not in the past met with full opposition from Congress, the constitutional requirements for the termination of treaties ratified by the Senate have been the subject of occasional debate between the legislature and the executive. Some commentators have argued that the termination of contracts is analogous to the termination of federal laws.197 Since national statutes can only be terminated through the same process in which they were enacted.198- that is, by a majority vote in both chambers, with the signature of the President or a veto-suspension, these commentators argue that treaties must also be broken by a procedure similar to their manufacture and which includes legislative power.199 Controversy surrounds the president`s legal power to enter into executive agreements. The practice of unilateral presidential agreements with foreign nations runs counter to the constitutional emphasis on joint decision-making and the Framers` understanding of the scope and extent of contractual power, which Hamilton described in a letter under the pseudonym “Camillus” as “competent for all provisions that might require the requirements of national affairs”; competent for the establishment of contracts of alliance, commercial contracts, peace treaties and any other type of convention, common among nations. And that is why it has been carefully guarded; The cooperation of two-thirds of the Senate with the President, who is required to enter into any contract.┬áThe constitutional text does not mention any executive agreement. Moreover, they have not referred to it either in the Constitutional Convention or in the State`s ratification conventions. The Federalist Papers are also silent about this. In the architecture of the Constitution, therefore, there is no support for the use of executive agreements. . . .